Jus strictum

: Holding a controlling person of the debtor subsidiarily liable remains one of the most accessible and effective
ways to settle debts to creditors in insolvency cases. The legislator employs an approach similar to that of delictual liability
to establish fault and causation concerning the actions or inaction of the controlling person, expressed through presuming
their guilt and providing an opportunity to rebut this assumption. However, in law enforcement practice, the approach to
establishing fault often remains formal and insufficiently substantiated, merely justified by reference to the existence of
a presumption. This approach is used due to the impossibility for the party seeking liability to provide relevant evidence.
This construction does not allow the person being held subsidiarily liable to simply invoke their good faith and refuse to
take an active procedural position. At the same time, a competition of presumptions arises, which currently has not found
a legislative solution. The paper analyses the correlation between the presumptions established by the legislator and
the options for their application, considering the allocation of the burden of proof between the parties to the dispute.
An examination of the specifics of the evidentiary process in cases of holding controlling persons of the debtor subsidiarily
liable in insolvency cases has made it possible to define the role of the court’s discretionary powers. The authors believe
that the risk of violating the constitutional rights and freedoms of persons against whom an application for subsidiary liability has been filed and to whom the presumption of guilt has been applied can be mitigated by considering the presumption of good faith through the establishment of the possibility for the court to allocate the burden of proof.

The Criminal Procedure Charter of 1864 (hereinafter referred to as the Charter) is rightfully recognised as
an outstanding monument of domestic criminal procedure legislation, which had a significant influence on the subsequent
development of the entire legal system of Russia. In this regard, an appeal to its provisions in the context of their comparison with the norms of the current Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation (hereinafter referred to as the CPC
RF) is of undoubted theoretical and practical interest. Such a study allows both identifying the continuity of key criminal
procedure institutions and tracing the evolution of legal categories, as well as assessing the degree to which the modern legislator has adopted historically tested models of legal regulation. In addition to the provisions of the Charter themselves,
significant attention is paid in the paper to the consideration of post-reform judicial practice in the form of cassation decisions of the Governing Senate, which makes it possible to more fully reconstruct the content of the legal institutions in
force during that period. Furthermore, given that the analysis of such law enforcement practice is almost entirely neglected
by modern researchers, it is believed to have independent scientific value. The paper examines the legislator’s conceptual
approaches to the regulation of the limits of the procedural powers of the defense counsel within a historical-comparative
aspect in order to identify opportunities for their improvement in modern legislation. The difference in the aforementioned
approaches of the past and modern legislators is demonstrated. Within the stated goal, proposals are substantiated aimed
at a more flexible regulation of the procedural status of the defense counsel by establishing a list of powers that the defense
counsel cannot exercise independently without the consent or instruction of the client, as well as a range of powers that
the defense counsel can exercise as a representative of the accused without their direct participation, provided there is
an appropriate instruction.